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After the NO votes 
Europe’s inflexible bank 
The European Central Bank seems accountable to no one and yet imposes punitive financial regimes 
on both old and new members of the EU. This has done nothing for growth or employment. 
by John Grahl 
IN THE member states of the European Union, the alternation of parties in government can 
sometimes reverse unsuccessful interventions and legislation, or repeal them. But in the EU itself the 
past is always acquis, to be affirmed and protected against criticism, however justified that criticism. 
The control of monetary policy by the European Central Bank (ECB) is insulated from all political 
control. 
Long before this regime came into force critics of every political orientation pointed out its 
dysfunctions. The structures were deeply undemocratic, depriving the elected, at both national and 
EU level, of any purchase on macroeconomic policies. Its priorities and objectives were unbalanced, 
so the ECB pursued price stability regardless of consequ-ences in unemployment, financial distress 
or disorganisation of the productive system. 
Budgetary policies within the stability pact sacrificed every other goal to meet the targets for public 
sector borrowing. The methods of the ECB, an exact copy of those developed in different 
circumstances by the Bundesbank, were said to be of guaranteed efficacy, regardless of the evidence. 
There was a dogmatic insistence on the value of monetary aggregates as a guide to policy, a decade 
after these indicators had been abandoned as useless by other central banks. Six years of experience 
with monetary union has confirmed every criticism, yet the whole design remains sacrosanct to 
official Europe. 
Over the past four years the average annual growth rate of the EU has been about 1.5%, much less 
than was achieved in the late 1990s and less than half that envisaged in the Lisbon strategy (1). The 
level of economic activity is not enough even to stabilise unemployment, which has risen in the 15 
old member states from 7.4% in 2001 to 8.1% in 2004. Although slightly higher growth rates have 
been achieved in the new member states, they are struggling with much higher rates of 
unemployment: 14.4% over the past four years (2). 
The unvarying response of the ECB to these problems is to call for more structural reforms: more 
wage and price flexibility, more labour mobility. After the French and Dutch referendums it is more 
difficult to use an inflationary threat to justify the insistence on labour market flexibility; the threat of 
globalisation is invoked to justify the same measures - deregulation, pressure on the unemployed, 
outsourcing by public sector and large private sector employers. But on a global basis eurozone 
economies are performing well. In 2004 only export markets were dynamic enough to sustain a rapid 
growth of output. Internal markets, particularly for investment goods, stagnated or contracted. 
If the stubborn search for flexibility, central to European economic policies for more than 20 years, 
could resolve the problem of unemployment in the EU, it would have done so by now. Together with 
persistently high unemployment, neoliberal labour market measures have reduced the share of wages 
in EU GDP from a peak of 73.4% in 1962 to 69.2% in the 1990s and a record low of 68% in 2004. 
The corresponding huge increase in profits, from less than 25% to almost 33% of GDP, strongly 
reinforced by taxation policies favourable to capital, has failed to produce the promised investment: 
in 2000-04 investment within the 25 rose only by an average 0.5%, while in the eurozone it 
decreased (-0.2% average); 2004 was the first year with any increase in investment (+3.2%) (3). 
Misunderstanding US policies 
Across a wide range of economic questions, EU leaderships are almost slavishly deferential to the 
United States. The entire Lisbon Agenda, with its risible ambition to make Europe “the easiest and 
cheapest place to do business in the world”, was inspired by an uncritical belief that the US stock-
market boom marked the emergence of a new economy. Renewed attempts to replicate the 
supposedly flexible labour markets of the US, the promotion of venture capital along US lines and 
the imitation of US corporate structures testified to the irrational exuberance that seized European 
leaderships at both EU and member state level. 
Yet the lessons Europeans might learn from US monetary policy are ignored. The status and 
objectives of the Federal Reserve system already offer an interesting contrast to those of the ECB, 
insouciantly reaffirmed in the draft constitutional treaty. In the US the Federal Reserve is just one 
government agency among others, subordinated to the will of Congress. Its purpose is to “maintain 
long-run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long-run 
potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, 
stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates”. The contrast between the ECB and the Federal 
Reserve has deep implications for macroeconomic policies. In the US these do not neglect the 
question of price stability, but they are equally concerned about levels of production and 
employment. In the face of persistent recession or rising unemployment, macroeconomic instruments 
are used to stimulate activity: the Reagan budgetary stimulus of the early 80s; interest rate cuts in the 
90s; the huge tax cuts of the Bush presidency. These policies are to be criticised, but they have 
resulted in rates of activity and employment superior to those in the EU over more than 20 years. 
The same applies to social policy: one might even suggest that economic growth is part of the US 
social model, or that growth is a substitute for social policies. Americans might live and die by the 
market, but at least they tend to insist that the market should function; short recessions to promote 
stability might be acceptable, but persistent stagnation in labour markets provokes electoral sanction. 
A consideration of US experience suggests the double irresponsibility of social policy-makers in 
contemporary Europe: there is continuous pressure to erode unemployment indemnities and to 
restrict the rights of the unemployed; but no macroeconomic measures are ever taken to provide 
employment. 
Persistent refusal of the British 
It would be hard to find a political question on which the British are more united than their rejection 
of the euro. Even among the minority strongly committed to European construction, almost nobody 
argues for British participation in the monetary union. A simple comparison of macroeconomic 
performance between Britain and the eurozone is enough. The current macroeconomic regime in 
Britain is seen as much more flexible and pragmatic than that in the eurozone, in both budgetary and 
monetary policy. The commission has often criticised the British government for violating the norms 
of the stability pact; but persistently high unemployment in France, Italy and Germany convinces the 
British that it is better to be outside the monetary union and not be bound by these norms. 
The absence of the British from the eurozone is a problem for the monetary union because it means 
that Britain’s large, liquid financial markets make only limited use of the euro. The autonomy of any 
monetary system today depends to a large extent on the scale and efficiency of its financial system. 
The huge expansion of the eurozone’s financial scale that would follow British participation would 
make it easier to conduct European monetary policy and counteract or offset the impact of outside 
disturbances for instance of changes in US policy. If leaders in the eurozone were concerned with the 
future of the monetary union, they would be working hard to revise the procedures and the 
substantive decisions of the ECB in ways that would promote employment and economic activity. 
The long period of preparation between the Maastricht treaty in 1992 and the introduction of the euro 
in 1999 was very damaging for several EU economies and for the eurozone as a whole: the arbitrary 
convergence targets for public finance, interest rates and exchange rates led to generally restrictive 
macroeconomic policies and rising unemployment. The logic of this ordeal was never clear; it 
amounted to the painful stabilisation of currencies destined to be withdrawn from circulation. The 
treatment of new member states is even more illogical. Unlike the French franc or the German mark, 
absorbed into the euro by way of the ecu, such currencies as the Polish zloty will disappear. And the 
total monetary weight of the new member states is so small that their economic circumstances can 
hardly influence that of the eurozone when they do finally join the union. 
In fact the technical integration of short-term credit markets that would be required for their 
participation in the monetary union has already been achieved. Nevertheless a lengthy period of 
tutelage is being imposed on these countries, as are the same arbitrary targets for inflation rates, 
exchange rates and public finance. Membership of the monetary union must only be open to those 
who can display the requisite macroeconomic masochism. At the same time the substantive problem 
of monetary integration in the new member states, to establish conversion rates to the euro that 
promote high levels of exports and employment, is neglected. 
Launched in 1999 at a exchange rate of about $1.16, the euro depreciated to about 82 cents by 2001 
as capital outflows related to the stock market bubble stimulated the dollar. Subsequently, the 
collapse of the US boom, amid major corporate scandals, pushed the dollar down and the euro up to 
new highs. In the world economy, growth and development are just as important as price stability 
and budgetary equilibrium in determining the exchange rate. The weaker dollar tended to insulate 
Europe from external disturbances, such as a rising oil prices and to widen the scope for a significant 
expansion in employment and activity. 
Investors around the world would be enthusiastic to hold eurozone assets. The failure to use this 
opportunity is costly. Continuing stagnation and the masochistic obsession with les grands équilibres 
are now working to weaken the euro, as there are fewer new European assets and less reason to 
participate in the European economies. 
As it was conceived almost 40 years go, monetary union in Europe was a radical and optimistic 
project: a common currency was seen as lifting constraints, above all those resulting from dollar 
supremacy. Today the realisation of this project in a conservative, dogmatic and anti-democratic 
form is a source of constraints, a self-imposed siege of the eurozone economies - above all of 
Germany, the paralysed giant of the EU. If the rejection of the constitutional treaty helps to question 
the macroeconomic regime, it will be a positive development in European construction. 
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More by John Grahl 
(1) The “ Lisbon strategy”, adopted at the European council meeting of March 2000, aimed to make 
the EU the world’s most dynamic and competitive economy. 
(2) Beyond Lisbon: Economic and Social Policy Orientations and Constitutional Cornerstones for 
the European Social Model, Euromemorandum, 2004. 
(3) Beyond Lisbon, op cit. 
• ✪ LMD around the world 
Le Monde diplomatique, originally published in French, has editions in 25 other languages  
 
